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Mediation-A Preferred Method of
'Dispute Resolution
Kenneth R. Feinberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
Burgeoning court dockets, spiraling litigation costs, and dissatisfac-
tion with the traditional adversarial process have caused increased in-
terest in and use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. A
wide variety of such mechanisms has developed, including mediation,
arbitration, mini-trials, summary jury trials, and numerous hybrid
dispute resolution proceedings. Each of these methods of dispute res-
olution offers certain advantages over conventional litigation in par-
ticular cases.
Among the various alternative dispute resolution methods, media-
tion stands out as particularly advantageous. Mediation has several
special features, including its informality, its flexibility and its com-
pletely voluntary and non-binding nature, that make it preferable
not only to litigation but often to other alternative means of dispute
resolution as well.
In this article, I will first direct the special advantages of mediation
as a method of resolving disputes. I will then outline a specific proce-
dure for the mediation of disputes that optimizes these advantages
and that can serve as a model. The procedure is one that I developed
and that I have used successfully on several occasions in a variety of
disputes. Finally, I will discuss some remaining problems in the area
of dispute resolution through mediation, that, unfortunately, act as
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obstacles to the more widespread use of this method of conflict
resolution.
II. ADVANTAGES OF MEDIATION
A. Advantages Over Litigation
The problems associated with litigation are well documented.'
Court costs and escalating legal fees make litigation a very expensive
endeavor. The expense is compounded by the long delays caused by
overcrowded court dockets and, sometimes, by dilatory procedural
and legal tactics.
Even more problematic than the costs and delays associated with
litigation are its inherent limitations as an effective means of dispute
resolution. Litigation focuses on narrow issues determined by prefab-
ricated legal doctrines. The outcome is limited by prior decisional
criteria and by narrow, predefined legal remedies. These limitations
rarely permit a full exploration of the factors underlying the dispute
and a resolution of the problems in the relationship that led to the
dispute between the parties. Indeed, the objective of litigation is not
to resolve the dispute so much as it is to arrive at a decision about
who is right and who is wrong.
Mediation, on the other hand, does not limit its focus to the dis-
crete legal claims asserted by the parties. Mediation looks beyond
the legal issues to explore the relationship between the parties in an
attempt to find a true resolution to the problem between them. Fur-
thermore, the potential outcomes of the mediation process are not
limited to preexisting legal remedies, or by the requirement that one
or the other party be found in the wrong. Thus, a wide range of crea-
tive "win-win" resolutions of the problems are possible.
Furthermore, the solution crafted through mediation is designed
specifically for and will apply only to the particular dispute at hand.
The outcome of a judicial procedure, on the other hand, will have
binding legal effect on future related disputes. There are several rea-
sons why parties may seek to avoid the establishment of judicial pre-
cedent, especially in new and uncertain areas of the law. Mediation
offers the parties the desired ability to focus on resolution of a spe-
cific dispute without worrying about its impact on future disputes.
Another problem with litigation is that it places the parties in an
1. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Paths to Justice:
Major Public Policy Issues of Dispute Resolution, Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Dis-
pute Resolution and Public Policy (Oct. 1983), in ACUS, SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL
AGENCY USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 5-53 (1987); DAUER, RE-
PORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONFIDENTIALITY IN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(CPR Oct. 1985); Hart, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation and
Minitrial, 37 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 113, 114-16 (1987).
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extremely adversarial process over which they have little control.
Litigation is controlled largely by the parties' lawyers, and proceed-
ings are conducted using language unfamiliar to the parties. En-
counters between the parties are rare and usually emotionally
charged, tending to antagonize them further. Parties also feel alien-
ated by the fact that the ultimate decision is not in their control, but
rather in the hands of a single adjudicator-the judge.
Mediation, on the other hand, is a cooperative process through
which the parties themselves fashion a mutually acceptable resolu-
tion to their dispute with the help of a neutral third party. Mediation
is essentially a negotiation process that seeks a convergence among
the parties rather than the polarization that characterizes litigation.
It also gives the parties control over the outcome. In sum, mediation
is preferable to litigation as a method of dispute resolution because,
unlike litigation, mediation offers the parties to a dispute the oppor-
tunity to participate actively in a cooperative process designed to
achieve a resolution to their problem that is not circumscribed by
preexisting legal theories or remedies.
B. Advantages of Mediation Over Other Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution
In addition to the qualities discussed above, mediation has several
special features that make it preferable not only to litigation, but also
to other forms of alternative dispute resolution.2 Primary among
these features are mediation's voluntary and non-binding nature, its
informality, its flexibility, and its cost-effectiveness. The advantages
of each of these qualities is discussed below.
1. Participation in Mediation is Voluntary and Nonbinding
Perhaps the most attractive feature of mediation is the fact that
participation in the process is completely voluntary and nonbinding.
Both the initial decision to try mediation and the decision to continue
participation in the process are left entirely to the parties. They re-
tain complete control of the process from beginning to end. If either
party is dissatisfied at any time with any aspect of the proceeding,
2. For descriptions and comparisons of various forms of alternative dispute reso-
lution, see ACUS, supra note 1; Cooley, Arbitration v. Mediation: Explaining the Dif-
ferences, 69 JUDICATURE 263 (1986); Hart, supra note 1; Sacks, The Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement: Wave of the Future or Flash in the Pan?, 26 ALBERTA L. REV.
233 (1988); AM. JUR. 2D, NEW TOPIC SERVICE, Alternative Dispute Resolution §§ 7-16
(1985).
that person can withdraw. The only commitment involved is to give
it a try.
Furthermore, if the attempt at mediation fails, no alternative op-
tions have been foreclosed. Parties are free after mediation to engage
in litigation or in other alternative methods of dispute resolution.
Thus very little, if any, risk is involved. As one commentator put it,
"[i]f it is going to work, it is going to work with some rapidity. If it's
not going to work, you don't lose a lot finding out."3
The fact that the decision to participate in mediation is risk-free
makes people more willing to try it. This gives mediation a signifi-
cant advantage among alternative dispute resolution techniques. As
will be discussed in greater detail in section IV, the single greatest
obstacle to successful development of alternative dispute resolution
techniques is an unwillingness, especially among lawyers, to try alter-
natives to litigation. The voluntary and nonbinding nature of the me-
diation process helps overcome this unwillingness and therefore
makes mediation especially attractive.
2. Mediation is Informal
Another advantageous feature of mediation is the informality of
the process. The exchange of thoughts and ideas through mediation
is not constrained by predetermined rules of evidence or other rules
that structure the presentation of information and other aspects of
the proceedings. In mediation, parties are free to set their own rules
and procedures and usually choose to forgo much of the formality as-
sociated with other forms of dispute resolution.
Mediation is considerably less formal than arbitration, for example.
Arbitration involves several formal stages and in many respects re-
sembles a trial.4 The parties make formal presentations of evidence
and of arguments and sometimes submit briefs. Furthermore, ex
parte communications between the arbitrator and the parties is pro-
hibited. The mediator of a dispute, on the other hand, can communi-
cate freely with each of the parties and can gather information in any
form.
A mediation is also less formal than a summary jury trial, the
structure of which, as indicated by its name, is modeled on a trial.5
In a summary jury trial, attorneys present formal arguments to a real
judge and a real jury in court. The difference between such a pro-
ceeding and an actual trial is the lack of witness testimony and the
advisory nature of the jury's verdict, not a lack of structure and for-
3. Hart, supra note 1, at 121 n.14.
4. See Cooley, supra note 2, at 264-66.
5. See Lambros, Summary Jury Trials, 13 LITIGATION 52 (1986); AM. JUR. 2D,
supra note 2, § 12.
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mality. Similarly, the format of a mini-trial resembles a judicial pro-
ceeding. A mini-trial does not involve a judge or jury. Rather,
presentations of the case are made by attorneys to the parties' execu-
tives in an effort to advance subsequent negotiations. The process,
however, is highly structured. While the parties to a mediation can
choose to incorporate a formal exchange of information or argu-
ments, the parties are free to forgo such formalities and all trappings
of courtroom proceedings.
3. Flexibility and Adaptability
Another advantageous feature of mediation is its adaptability to a
vast, wide-ranging variety of disputes. There is a long history of us-
ing mediation to address labor and employment disputes.6 More re-
cently, mediation has been applied successfully to resolve family
disputes, community disputes, environmental disputes, landlord-ten-
ant disputes, and even criminal matters. In my own particular experi-
ence as a mediator, cases involving commercial contractual disputes,
construction defects, product liability claims arising out of govern-
ment use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, antitrust claims, as well as al-
legations of larceny, embezzlement and RICO violations have all
been satisfactorily resolved through mediation. Mediation can be
tried in any kind of dispute. No law governs its availability or re-
stricts its use. Moreover, it is suitable not only for disputes between
two parties but also for multiparty disputes and even in class
actions. 7
Mediation also can be employed at any stage in a dispute, whether
or not litigation is already pending. The parties can schedule a medi-
ation soon (even within days) after the dispute arises. On the other
hand, the parties can enter mediation after litigation commences. If
litigation has already commenced and proceeded into discovery, the
parties can draw on discovery materials. If mediation is begun before
the parties reach the discovery stage, they can choose to incorporate a
"mini-discovery" schedule into the mediation process.
This kind of procedural flexibility is one of mediation's foremost
qualities and is one reason that mediation is adaptable to a wide vari-
ety of disputes. As one commentator has put it, "[a] mediation can
proceed along any path and according to any format depending upon
6. See generally M. BERNSTEIN, PRIVATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 315 (1968).
7. See generally Phillips & Piazzva, The Role of Mediation in Public Interest Dis-
putes, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1231 (1983); Susskind & Ozawa, Mediated Negotiation in the
Public Sector, 27 AM. BEHAV'L SCIENTIST 255 (1986).
the circumstances of the case and the predilections of the mediator."8
Furthermore, as indicated previously, a mediator is not constrained
by rules governing formation of a record or appropriate forms of
communications with the parties. A mediator is free to adopt operat-
ing procedures that fit the precise needs of the parties and can
change those procedures at any time during the process if necessary.
Another reason that mediation is adaptable to a vast range of dis-
putes is the ability of the parties to choose the mediator. The parties
may, for example, seek out an individual who has had prior experi-
ence in resolving similar disputes. Or the parties in a dispute involv-
ing detailed technical issues may want to employ a mediator with
technical expertise. This enables the parties to save the time they
would otherwise spend on educating a factfinder, be it a judge, jury
or arbitrator, about the technical aspects of their case. 9
4. Cost-Effectiveness
The cost-effectiveness of mediation as a dispute resolution device is
another attractive feature of mediation. Mediation is cost-effective in
several respects. First, mediation generally requires little time when
compared to such means of dispute resolution as litigation and arbi-
tration.10 Examples from my own experience as a mediator illustrate
this. It took only three months to settle a ten-year-old antitrust dis-
pute between competitors in the telephone paging business. It took
only ten days to resolve another dispute between a shipper and sup-
plier. By saving time, the parties to the dispute minimize the costs-
such as lost revenues and lost business opportunities-associated with
diversion of staff and attention from ongoing business activities.
Moreover, minimizing time means minimizing legal fees, which are
often the most costly aspect of a business dispute.11
Mediation helps parties to minimize legal fees in other ways as
8. Hart, supra note 1, at 119.
9. On the other hand, even in a case involving complex technical issues, the par-
ties may not need a mediator with technical expertise. In mediation, it is the parties
themselves who already have the requisite knowledge and make all the decisions. Un-
like a judge or arbitrator, the mediator cannot impose a decision; thus, the mediator's
technical understanding of the issues may not be crucial.
10. Estimates of the average duration of litigation and arbitration vary. American
Jurisprudence reports that the average arbitration takes four to five months, while lit-
igation may take several years. AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 2, § 7. Another source reports
that the average duration from filing to trial in civil cases in federal courts throughout
the United States is one and one-half years. Sacks, supra note 2, at 233. It can take up
to six years to litigate a business dispute. THE FIRST ANNUAL JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (May 20, 1983),
reprinted in 100 F.R.D. 499, 521 (1984).
11. See ROGERS & SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW 45
(1987) (reporting that researchers have found that, on average, some 98% of a party's
civil litigation expenses are attorney's fees).
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well. Unlike both litigation and other alternative means of dispute
resolution, mediation emphasizes participation by the parties them-
selves, rather than giving control over the process to lawyers. The
parties may not even find it necessary to hire outside counsel. In-
deed, my own experience in the mediation of business disputes indi-
cates that direct dealings with the parties, as opposed to their
attorneys, is more effective. Of course, the fee paid to the mediator,
who is often a lawyer, may be substantial. This cost, however, is
shared by the parties. Similarly, the parties can share other costs by,
for example, mutually agreeing on experts to be consulted.12
Mediation also allows parties to avoid the emotional costs associ-
ated with such adversarial dispute resolution methods as litigation
and arbitration. As one of my clients has commented publicly: "You
don't expend as much emotional energy as you do in court, and that's
a huge cost savings."13
The nonadversarial, cooperative nature of mediation and its focus
on the needs of the parties also help parties to avoid the costs associ-
ated with damage or destruction of their business relationship. Ad-
versarial processes often increase antagonism among the parties and
damage or destroy the potential for a positive relationship. Media-
tion, on the other hand, seeks to encourage cooperation among the
parties, not only with regard to the immediate dispute, but also with
regard to structuring their relationship in the future. It thus leaves
open the possibility of profitable future business among them. Some
have suggested that going through the mediation process may even
help parties avoid future disputes:
Many commentators have compared the mediator to a catalyst, one who
prompts action by others through identification of issues, clarification of facts,
reason, and persuasion. In doing so, the mediator will help educate each party
(at least those with a continuing relationship) not merely for the resolution of
the present dispute, but for the resolution and even prevention of further
disputes.1 4
Mediation's ability to help parties preserve opportunities for future
business and to avoid the cost of future disputes is further evidence
of its cost-effectiveness.
12. See Liepmann, Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation: Should Third
Parties Have Access to the Process?, 14 ENVTL. AFF. 93, 103 (1986).
13. Abramson, Kenneth Feinberg Prospers by Getting Firms to Resolve Disputes
Out of Court, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1988, at B6, col. 1 (quoting William Von Glahn, an
attorney for Williams Cos. in Tulsa, Okla.).
14. Henry & Lieberman, Mediation: The Sleeping Giant of Business Dispute Reso-
lution, in THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO RESOLVING LEGAL DISPUTES 59-60 (1985), re-
printed in CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, PRACTICE GUIDE ON MEDIATION Al, A3-A4 (1988).
Finally, there are some indications that agreements arrived at'
through mediation have greater durability than those arrived at
through adjudicatory proceedings, such as litigation or arbitration.15
Unlike a' court decree or arbitrator's award, the outcome of a media-
tion is one fashioned, and agreed to, by the parties themselves. No
coercion is ever used since the mediator has no power to impose a
settlement. Thus, as one commentator has stated: "By definition, a
settlement reached through mediation is an efficient outcome; all the
disputants and stakeholders prefer it to no agreement at all, or to any
other feasible outcome." 16 In other words, mediation results in more
stable agreements and, therefore, may enable parties to avoid costs
associated with future noncompliance.
In sum, mediation is cost-effective because the process itself is eco-
nomical and because the result of a successful mediation is often not
only a durable agreement but a more stable relationship between the
parties as well.
III. THE FEINBERG MEDIATION PROCEDURE
While there is certainly no set procedure for how a mediation must
be conducted, my own experience as a mediator has led me to de-
velop and refine a four-phase procedure that can serve as a useful
blueprint for voluntary mediation of disputes. The mediation proce-
dure I employ reflects and maximizes the general advantages of me-
diation discussed above. It is private, purely voluntary, and informal.
It features a structured exchange of information through the use of a
mutually acceptable third party mediator and uses a nonbinding, me-
diator-generated proposal as a starting point for the negotiations. It
also allows the parties to integrate into the mediation schedule a
mini-discovery procedure, including deposition testimony and docu-
ment production.
The proposed method is sufficiently flexible to address a wide
range of situations and has proven to be readily adaptable to a variety
of disputes, including breach of contract, unfair competition, allega-
tions of construction defects, toxic torts (including allocation of finan-
cial responsibility among joint defendants), insurance coverage
allocations, proprietary rights, and any number of other claims.17
15. See Rogers & Salem, supra note 11, at 46; Susskind & Weinstein, Toward a
Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 BRIT. COLUM. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
311, 312-13 (1980-81); Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV.
441, 444 n.25 (1984).
16. L. SUSSKIND, L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES
2 (1983).
17. A sampling of successful mediations in which I have employed some variation
of the procedure outlined here includes: American Reins. Co. v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co. (asbestos insurance coverage dispute involving a primary insurer and a rein-
surer); Industrial Risk Insurers v. The Williams Cos. (insurance coverage dispute in-
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And the process is not limited to situations where pending litigation
already exists among the various parties. Indeed, a major advantage
of the mediation process set forth below has been its success in head-
ing off the initiation of formal litigation.
A. Phase I: Retaining a Mediator to Resolve the Dispute (and
Setting the Ground Rules)
The: initial step in any mediation is getting the parties to agree to
participate. This initial step is critical. Once the parties have taken
this step and agreed to the effort, their attitudes shift toward prob-
lem-solving and cooperation.
Any party involved in a dispute may unilaterally initiate the medi-
ation process by contacting the other parties and suggesting the use
of a neutral third party mediator to hear the dispute, recommend set-
tlement terms, and, if necessary, attempt to facilitate a settlement. A
meeting with the proposed mediator and all parties may then be held
to give the parties an opportunity to "size up" the proposed mediator
and to discuss the proposed rules governing the mediation. A
number of points should be addressed at this meeting.
First, there should be some discussion of the role of the mediator.
It should be emphasized that, although one party may have recom-
mended a particular person be retained as the mediator, any person
ultimately selected must be mutually acceptable to all parties to the
dispute.I8 Once retained, the mediator will be strictly neutral and
volving property damage and business interruption claims); In re Agent Orange
Product Liability Litigation, MDL No. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (product liability litigation
and allocation of market share financial responsibility among seven chemical compa-
nies); D.P.R.S., Inc. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., C.A. 75-2054-K (D. Mass. 1985)
(private antitrust litigation); Coltrans Sys. v. Nissan Motors (contract dispute involving
shipper and supplier); J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Response Sys. Int'l (contract dispute
involving an insurance consultant relationship); Villa Monterey Condominium Owners
Ass'n v. Ponderosa Homes (condominium construction and insurance coverage dispute
involving homeowners and over 50 insurance carriers, contractors and subcontractors);
ISDC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (private antitrust litigation); Liquid Carbonic v.
Osborne (commercial dispute involving ownership of compressed gas cylinders); Rus-
sell v. Venamon (commercial dispute involving termination of insurance brokerage
partnerships).
18. The Center for Public Resources (CPR) has developed a list of attributes that
parties should consider in selecting a capable mediator. The mediator should be: im-
partial and fair; able to inspire trust and confidence; able to understand and relate to
people; civil and considerate in dealings with others; a good listener; able to under-
stand the law and the facts of a dispute and to quickly analyze complex problems;
knowledgeable about when to intervene and when not to; creative and imaginative; ar-
ticulate and persuasive; knowledgeable about the negotiation process; persistent and
"upbeat" in the face of difficulties; and an energetic leader. CPR LEGAL PROGRAM,
scrupulously fair to all sides. Unless all parties otherwise agree, no
party will unilaterally communicate with the mediator except as spe-
cifically provided.
Second, there should be some discussion of the mediator's payment
through an agreed-upon cost-sharing arrangement. In the interest of
moving the process forward, the party initiating the process and rec-
ommending a particular mediator may (or may not) agree to pay the
mediator's initial fees and expenses associated with Phase II of the
mediation process-familiarizing the mediator with the facts of the
dispute-without requesting contribution from the other parties.
Only if all sides consent to proceed with Phase III (and, if necessary,
Phase IV) will the costs of the mediation be borne in a manner deter-
mined and agreed to by the parties. The mediator's per diem or
hourly charge should be established at the time of appointment.
Third, the mediator should summarize the procedures governing
the mediator's efforts to settle the dispute (Phase II, Phase III and
Phase IV). The mediator should emphasize the voluntary, nonbind-
ing nature of the process by making it clear that, at any phase of the
process, even at the very end of the mediation, any party may with-
draw without giving a reason and pursue more traditional remedies.
Fourth, the mediator should explain that the entire mediation pro-
cess is a compromise negotiation and, therefore, confidential. Accord-
ingly, all offers, promises, conduct and statements, whether oral or
written, made in the course of the mediation process by any of the
parties or their representatives, are confidential. Such information is
inadmissible and not discoverable for any purpose in litigation among
the parties. By agreement of the parties, the mediator is also disqual-
ified as a litigation witness for any party, and the mediator's oral and
written opinions are deemed inadmissible for all purposes. All writ-
ten submissions presented to the mediator and all discussions be-
tween the mediator and a particular party will not be transmitted to
any other party unless designated by the mediator as worthy of trans-
mission and only if the permission of the party providing the infor-
mation is obtained in advance.
.Fifth, if the dispute (or group of disputes) giving rise to mediation
is already the subject of pending litigation among the parties, the me-
diator may ask the consent of all parties to notify the court of the
mediator's retention. 19 Unless the consent of the parties is given,
however, no such notification should be made. The mediator may re-
MODEL ADR PROCEDURE FOR MEDIATION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES 6, reprinted in CPR
LEGAL PROGRAM, PRACTICE GUIDE ON MEDIATION, supra note 14, at B1, B9.
19. The parties may also decide to present a joint motion to the court requesting a
stay of all proceedings pending the conclusion of the mediation process.
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new this request at any time. Again, however, the mediator would
have to gain the consent of all parties.
Finally, a proposed schedule is discussed and agreed to for the com-
pletion of the mediation, including, if necessary, a "mini-discovery"
process for obtaining documents or certain deposition testimony or
both.
The advantage of the above approach to retaining a mediator is
that it encourages the parties to accept both the particular mediator
and the entire mediation process. Generally, parties are open to the
education afforded by Phase I. No side is bound in advance by the
proposed process, and the initiating party may agree to shoulder the
initial costs, thereby giving the other parties a cost-free preview of
the process. Acceptance of the mediator recommended by the initiat-
ing party is also rarely a problem. The noninitiating parties are
aware that the entire process is voluntary and nonbinding and, from
a negotiation perspective, may actually anticipate some bargaining
leverage in agreeing to a mediator recommended by the initiating
side. This is because the mediator cannot easily be accused by the
noninitiating party of being unfair or biased if the proposed settle-
ment terms are perceived by the initiating party as unacceptable.
B. Phase II: Familiarizing the Mediator with the Facts
of the Dispute
Once the mediator has been selected with the consent of all par-
ties, the actual mediation process commences. The first step in this
process is to educate the mediator about the dispute both by submis-
sion of written materials and through oral presentations.
First, the mediator asks each party to provide, pursuant to an
agreed upon schedule, such materials as each party deems necessary
to familiarize the mediator with the facts and issues in dispute. For
example, this submission may consist of a written summary accompa-
nied by already available court documents, a letter, a formal memo-
randum, a legal brief, etc. Upon studying the documents and
reviewing the facts, the mediator may contact any party separately,
requesting further clarification and additional information. The par-
ties are to comply promptly with all reasonable requests by the medi-
ator for further information relevant to the dispute. Written
materials submitted to the mediator are considered confidential and
may not be disseminated to anyone without the consent of the sub-
mitting party.
After the mediator has had an opportunity to review the written
submissions of the parties, the mediator will preside over an initial
mediation session with all sides present. Each party may be repre-
sented by whomever it wishes: outside counsel, in-house counsel, a
corporate official, or a combination of persons. My own experience,
however, proves that an in-house representative is more likely to
move the mediation process forward in an efficient, effective manner.
In any event, the chosen representative must have appropriate au-
thority to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the party he or she
represents.
A series of such public mediation sessions may be necessary in the
event of a complex, multi-party dispute or if a group of similar cases
is targeted for mediation. For example, one session might involve
plaintiffs and defendants, a second session might involve insurance
carriers, a third might involve subcontractors. Or it may prove useful
to have different sessions devoted to consideration of one or more of
a group of similar cases.
Before beginning the mediation session, the mediator first asks
whether, in fact, each party seriously desires to settle the dispute. If
the answer is negative-because, for example, the parties wish to liti-
gate the case-the mediator declines to go forward, and the process
terminates at this point.
The mediator also explains at the outset that this initial public
meeting will likely be the only time that the parties will all meet, un-
less the case is particularly complex or unless a group meeting is
deemed by the mediator to be necessary near the end of Phase IV.
Remaining meetings or discussions will be held separately between
the mediator and each party; communications between the various
parties concerning settlement terms will be made only by the
mediator.
After these introductory remarks by the mediator, the parties can
begin the public session. First, a statement is made by each party in
the presence of the mediator and the other parties-in effect, a sum-
mation. This statement of between thirty and forty-five minutes
(which can be waived) gives all other parties (especially the princi-
pals) and the mediator an opportunity to hear a summarized first-
hand account of the strengths of each party's position. Thereafter,
each side is given an agreed upon time (usually two to four hours in a
straightforward, less complex mediation) to present its case. Each
side should present the merits of its position in what it perceives to
be the most effective manner. This can be done through the presen-
tation of witnesses or through statements of the principals or their
attorneys. Traditional rules of evidence do not apply, and no formal
transcribing of the presentation occurs.
[Vol. 16: S5, 1989] Mediation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
If necessary, time may be set aside during the public session to per-
mit the parties to engage in "mini-discovery." Examples include per-
mitting examination of witnesses or authorizing the exchange of
certain documents. The procedures for such "mini-discovery" must
be agreed to in advance, including time limitations. Furthermore, the
mediator presides over the process and makes sure that the parties
adhere to the agreed upon schedule.
At the conclusion of the public session, the mediator meets pri-
vately and confidentially with each party in order to (1) gather addi-
tional facts not brought out during the public session and (2) elicit
further confidential information thought necessary in light of the
written submissions and public statements. During the private, confi-
dential meetings, the mediator may also raise legal arguments and
questions of law in an effort to evaluate the party's ultimate likeli-
hood of success or failure if the dispute were resolved through litiga-
tion. Sharing legal considerations with individual parties is
important, because legal uncertainty has proven to be a critical varia-
ble promoting settlement.
After receiving all relevant materials, reviewing all of the facts, an-
alyzing all of the various key legal issues, and permitting each party
an opportunity to present its best case, the mediator is prepared to
declare Phase II of the process at an end and to proceed to Phase III,
in which the mediator presents proposed settlement terms for sepa-
rate consideration by each party. Before proceeding to Phase III,
however, the mediator awaits the consent of each party. Experience
indicates that if the parties perceive that Phase II of the mediation
process was fair, and they believe that the mediator is competent and
neutral, the parties, curious to learn of the mediator's non-binding
settlement terms and the rationale for fashioning those terms, will
agree to proceed to Phase III.
C. Phase III: The Mediator's Presentation of Settlement Terms and
the Initial Reaction of the Parties
During Phase III, the mediator prepares and presents a written set-
tlement recommendation and a private written analysis for each
party. The mediator separately explains in writing to each party
both the proposed settlement terms and the confidential reasons un-
derlying the mediator's proposal.
There are two key features of the mediator's Phase III presenta-
tion of a proposed settlement. First, the presentation is based on a
good faith effort by the mediator to offer the fairest settlement terms
at the very outset. In other words, the mediator is not engaging in an
opening negotiation gambit or offering terms in anticipation of fur-
ther negotiation. Further negotiation may indeed occur as a part of
Phase IV (Shuttle Diplomacy), but the purpose of the mediator's
Phase III proposal is to give all parties the immediate opportunity to
accept what the mediator has concluded to be the fairest resolution of
the dispute without the necessity of further negotiation. The media-
tor's goal is to settle the dispute promptly by offering optimum set-
tlement terms that will prove immediately acceptable to all sides.
The second key feature of Phase III is that the separate, private re-
action of each party to the mediator's proposed terms is sealed and is
not communicated to the other parties (unless, of course, all parties
agree to the proposed terms, thereby settling the dispute). Accord-
ingly, no side knows the reaction of the other parties to the media-
tor's proposed terms or of any counterproposal offered by others to
the mediator. The mediator, and the mediator alone, communicates
among the parties when the process moves to Phase IV.
Thus, Phase III procedures give all parties the opportunity to react
candidly in confidence to the proposed settlement terms and ration-
ale that the mediator hopes will bring the dispute to an immediate,
successful conclusion. The parties need not be concerned that their
candid reaction to the various terms will become known prior to for-
mal litigation or trial, thereby compromising their public posture.
If Phase III is successful, the mediator's proposed settlement terms
are accepted by all parties and the process moves to a relatively quick
conclusion. In my experience, this happens about twenty-five per-
cent of the time. If, on the other hand, the Phase III settlement
terms are rejected but the parties desire to continue the mediation,
the mediator retains the flexibility to attempt to bridge differences
among the parties through Phase IV shuttle diplomacy. In my expe-
rience, this happens about seventy-five percent of the time.
D. Phase IV: Shuttle Diplomacy
Phase IV is the final phase of the mediation process and com-
mences only if the mediator's Phase III presentation of proposed set-
tlement terms proves unacceptable to any party. Phase IV is
essentially the mediator's attempt, through shuttle diplomacy, to
forge a consensus based on each party's confidential communication
of its negotiating position.
There are two critical aspects in this final phase of the mediation
process. First, the mediator meets separately with each party and
then shuttles among the various parties (by telephone and, if neces-
sary, in face-to-face meetings) in an effort to bridge the differences
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and reach accommodation. Until and unless the mediator sees an ad-
vantage to a group meeting of the parties, no such meeting occurs.
Instead, the mediator attempts to fashion a mutually acceptable set-
tlement proposal through separate meetings and communications
with the other parties.
Second, as already indicated, the substantive conversations with
each party are confidential and are not conveyed to the other parties.
Instead, the mediator listens to each party's settlement terms and
transmits only such information to the other parties as is agreed
upon and that the mediator believes will foster settlement of the
dispute.
The shuttle diplomacy called for by Phase IV may take place in a
concentrated period of time. Throughout the shuttle diplomacy
phase of the mediation, the mediator is guided by the "best" settle-
ment proposal presented in Phase III. The mediator uses the Phase
III proposal as a starting point and attempts to convince the parties
to minimize their differences with respect to it.
If the parties remain unable to agree on settlement terms, the me-
diator may eventually suggest that the pressure be intensified in an
effort to secure a settlement. For example, if formal litigation is al-
ready pending, the mediator may again suggest that the court be noti-
fied of the mediation process and that its assistance be solicited. Or
the mediator may call for a non-stop group meeting to resolve re-
maining disagreements face-to-face. In the alternative, the mediator
may suggest that the in-house corporate officials meet to discuss ob-
stacles to settlement and attempt to reach a settlement without any
further assistance from the mediator. The mediator might also sug-
gest that a new group of senior corporate officials be brought into the
negotiations in an effort to resolve remaining issues. As a last resort,
the mediator may suggest that the parties agree to accept, as final
and binding, new settlement terms proposed by the mediator.
Of course, no such Phase IV mediation option may be imposed uni-
laterally by the mediator. Rather, any such procedure requires the
consent of all parties. Furthermore, as emphasized earlier, a party
may withdraw at any time during the process and pursue more tradi-
tional remedies.
Phase IV concludes when a settlement is agreed to. If a settlement
is reached, one of the parties (or the mediator) is designated to draft
a written document reflecting all settlement terms. This document is
circulated among the parties, edited to reflect their exact understand-
ing, and formally executed. If formal litigation is pending and the
court has not yet been made aware of the mediation process, it is no-
tified so that it may dismiss the case.
IV. REMAINING PROBLEMS
Despite the many advantages of mediation as a method of dispute
resolution, certain problems remain. Three problems in particular
act as impediments to the more widespread use of mediation: (1) un-
willingness to try mediation, (2) lack of institutionalized considera-
tion of mediation as a dispute resolution option, and (3) legal
uncertainty about the confidentiality of mediation.
A. Unwillingness to Try Mediation
The single greatest obstacle to the successful development of medi-
ation in general, and to the initiation of any particular mediation, is
unwillingness to try it. Despite repeated complaints about litigation,
there is still a great deal of reluctance, especially among attorneys, to
try such alternative methods of dispute resolution. There are several
factors that may account for this unwillingness, including what one
commentator termed "the deadening drag of status quoism."20
Perhaps the primary factor contributing toward unwillingness to
try mediation is simply unfamiliarity with the process. This unfamil-
iarity stems largely from the lack of education, particularly in law
school, about nonadversarial methods of dispute resolution.2 1 The
standard law school curriculum trains students to be staunch advo-
cates in an adversarial system and offers little, if any, opportunity to
develop negotiating skills.
Law schools' adversarial emphasis as well as the litigious orienta-
tion of legal practice creates a mindset that is incompatible with me-
diation and negotiation. As one commentator explained:
The lawyer's standard philosophical map is useful primarily where the as-
sumptions upon which it is based-adversariness and amenability to solution
by a general rule imposed by a third party--are valid. But when mediation is
appropriate, these assumptions do not fit. The problem is that many lawyers
... tend to suppose that these assumptions are germane in nearly any situa-
tion that they confront as lawyers. The map, and the litigation paradigm on
which it is based, has a power all out of proportion to its utility. Many law-
yers, therefore, tend not to recognize mediation as a viable means of reaching
a solution; and worse, they see the kinds of unique solutions that mediation
20. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 132 (1976) (address de-
livered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice).
21. See generally 4 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Academic Mis-
match 7 (Aug. 1986) (reporting on a recent survey of 6800 law students at seven north-
eastern law schools in which 58% responded that knowledge of negotiation and
mediation was vital to practice but generally agreed that they did not learn about it in
law school); Special Project, Sef-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies
in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 845, 987-88 (1984).
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can produce as threatening to the best interests of their clients.2 2
This predisposition among lawyers against nonadversarial means of
dispute resolution is a major impediment to the successful initiation
of individual mediations and to the future growth of mediation as a
dispute resolution technique.
Another reason that lawyers, and sometimes their clients, are hesi-
tant to try mediation of a dispute is the fear of appearing weak to the
other side. The above discussion of the many advantages of media-
tion, particularly among parties with an ongoing relationship, demon-
strates that there are many reasons for preferring mediation over
litigation, even for a party who would have a strong position in court.
Nonetheless, there is a popular perception that suggesting any alter-
native method of dispute resolution implies a fear of the potential
outcome of litigation. The underlying assumption of this perception
is that litigation is the norm and that any alternative to litigation is
the exception, reserved for exceptionally weak cases. If, however, al-
ternatives to litigation were routinely considered and initiated by a
given party, the other *party would have no reason to associate an of-
fer of mediation with weakness.
This brings us to the next issue-the need for businesses and other
organizations to institutionalize consideration of mediation as a
means of resolving a dispute.
B. The Need for Institutionalization
There has been a good deal of institutionalization by the courts and
other governmental organizations of alternative methods of dispute
resolution, including mediation.23 Court-associated alternative dis-
pute resolution programs, however, are focused primarily on the res-
olution of family disputes, neighborhood or community disputes, and
criminal matters. They do not usually address commercial or busi-
ness disputes.
Among corporations and other business entities, alternative meth-
ods of dispute resolution are generally used only on a piecemeal,
case-by-case basis. Thus, mediation continues to be largely a "hit or
miss" experimental device, alien to the normal decisionmaking pro-
22. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 45 (1982).
23. See generally Pou, Federal Agency Use of "ADR ": The Experience to Date, in
ACUS, supra note 1, at 101 (1987); Ray, Kestner, & Freedman, Dispute Resolution:
From Examination to Experimentation, 65 MICH. B.J. 898 (1986); Smith, Alternative
Means of Dispute Resolution: Practices and Possibilities in the Federal Government,
1984 Mo. J. OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9.
cess of a company or other organization. The challenge faced by ad-
vocates of mediation is to institutionalize it and make its
consideration and use an integral part of an organization's process of
decisionmaking about both pending and anticipated disputes. In par-
ticular, what is needed is an in-house procedure to assure that every
dispute is considered for mediation.
Institutionalization of such alternative dispute resolution tech-
niques as mediation will, of course, depend on both the particular
company structure that exists for resolving disputes, as well as the
nature and quantity of the disputes themselves. Within the confines
of these two overriding considerations, however, the following
blueprint can and should be evaluated by any company or organiza-
tion that is looking for efficient and effective means of resolving dis-
putes. It sets forth guidelines for the development of an alternative
dispute resolution program through which every dispute is consid-
ered for resolution through mediation or through some other alterna-
tive method before proceeding to litigation.
1. Commitment of the Company's Management
A successful alternative dispute resolution program within a com-
pany will need a high-level commitment by the company. Without
such a commitment from top management, particularly the general
counsel, neither in-house business officials nor outside counsel will
be confident in referring a matter to Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR).
One way of demonstrating this commitment is by signing a state-
ment expressing general support for alternative methods of dispute
resolution. The Center for Public Resources (CPR) has developed a
program called the "Corporate Policy Statement on Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution," widely known as the "ADR pledge." Signatory
companies are obliged to explore ADR as an option before resorting
to litigation. To subscribe, the company's chief legal officer and chief
executive officer must sign the pledge. Such an explicit expression of
high level support for ADR not only sends a signal to other compa-
nies that raising ADR as an option is not to be interpreted as a sign
of weakness, but also sends a signal to lower-level employees in the
company that the company's policy is to try to work out disputes
before resorting to litigation.2 4 In order to ensure that companies'
outside counsel are considering ADR in lieu of traditional litigation,
24. One corporate official of a signatory company has indicated publicly that par-
ticipation in the program has encouraged the use of ADR by relieving the fear that
raising ADR will be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Rich, Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution-Opening Doors to Settlements, CHEMICAL WEEK (Aug. 14, 1985), at 28, 30 (quot-
ing Robert A. Butler, chief litigation counsel for Union Carbide).
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one commentator has recommended that the ADR pledge be adapted
for law firm use, drafted in terms of recommending consideration of
ADR to their clients.25
The commitment of the company to ADR methods must go beyond
merely signing a statement, however. The company must demon-
strate its commitment actively through frequent use of a variety of
ADR techniques to resolve disputes. Only an actual commitment to
ADR will create the proper atmosphere for prompt resolution of a
dispute and quell the natural concerns and suspicions that opponents
may harbor.
Publicizing the fact that a company automatically considers use of
ADR in all cases, regardless of the size of the case or the strength of
its legal position, will further alleviate the concern that willingness
to initiate use of various ADR techniques will be perceived by adver-
saries as a sign of weakness. A company can publicize the fact that
consideration of ADR is an inherent part of its natural decisionmak-
ing process by including, in all of its commercial contracts and deal-
ings with outside parties, a provision that mediation, arbitration, or
other forms of ADR will automatically be considered in the event of
a dispute.26 In addition, the company can undertake a public rela-
tions campaign notifying consumers and business partners that ADR
will be available as a first-step consideration in resolving any future
dispute. The goal is to make clear to those dealing with the company
that resorting to ADR is not reserved for the occasional "bad" case
and should not, therefore, be considered a sign of weakness. Rather,
it is a standard technique that will be considered in all cases.
2. Responsibility for In-House ADR Screening of Disputes
As part of its commitment to the ADR process, a company must
involve high-level, in-house personnel in the ADR screening of dis-
putes. A single individual, at the general counsel or assistant general
counsel level, should have primary responsibility for screening all
real and potential disputes to determine their suitability for ADR.
25. CPR LEGAL PROGRAM PROCEEDINGS 66 (Feb. 1984) (quoting E. Judge Elderkin
of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison), reprinted in CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, INFORMATION
PACKAGE ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF ADR PROCEEDINGS (1984).
26. Sample mediation clauses for inclusion in standard contracts are provided in
CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, MODEL ADR PROCEDURES FOR MEDIATION OF BUSINESS DIS-
PUTES 11 (1987), reprinted in CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, PRACTICE GUIDE ON MEDIATION,
supra note 14, at B14; AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL MEDIATION
RULES 2 (1986), reprinted in CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, PRACTICE GUIDE ON MEDIATION,
supra note 14, at C2; A Short-Form Mediation Clause, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27, 1989, at 5.
By designating a particular in-house official for this task, systematic
consideration will be assured and consistent in-house guidelines es-
tablished. Over time, a body of in-house standards for consideration
of ADR will evolve.
The company should also designate a non-attorney member of top
management (or a group of non-attorneys) to be actively involved in
the ADR screening process. This individual should be a substantive
expert in the area of dispute resolution and should also be educated
about the strengths and weaknesses of various ADR techniques. This
business representative should also bring a business orientation to
the ADR table and offer practical business considerations about why
a particular dispute should or should not be referred to ADR.. The
level of business judgment necessary for the job will depend on the
types of disputes a company includes in its screening process. If the
company limits ADR to a particular class of disputes, such as con-
sumer complaints for example, a high level of business judgment
may not be necessary. More sophisticated business judgment would
be required in the ADR assessment process, however, if more com-
plex corporate or commercial disputes are included in the process.
The objective is to involve an individual in the process who will view
a given dispute as a business problem rather than a legal one and
who may be able to see settlement options other than the payment of
money.
In addition to the active involvement of certain high-level person-
nel, all members of the in-house general counsel's office should be fa-
miliar with the strengths and weaknesses of various ADR techniques.
Appropriate outside counsel-particularly in the substantive area in-
volved in the dispute-should also be familiar with various ADR op-
tions and, most importantly, should understand the company's
commitment to the use of ADR.
Everyone involved in the ADR process should be kept up to date
on current developments. In order to obtain the full benefits of ADR
and develop an evolving awareness of its advantages and uses, the
company should expend the necessary resources to keep its manage-
ment and inside and outside legal staff apprised of ADR successes
and failures. Seminars and training programs should be used to max-
imize effective use of ADR and to learn from past uses of various
ADR techniques. Preparation and in-house distribution of an ADR
primer should also be considered.
3. The Formal Structure of ADR Decisionmaking
Consideration of various ADR options must be integrated into the
existing formal decisionmaking structure of the company. Accord-
ingly, any ADR screening procedure will have to be tailored to the
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decisionmaking process already in place. Nevertheless, there are
some specific steps that can likely be implemented regardless of the
particular decisionmaking process.
The official (or officials) who initially review all litigation (poten-
tial or real) directed against the company should immediately con-
sider the viability of ADR as a way to resolve a given dispute.
Similarly, when the company is a potential plaintiff, the official with
responsibility for filing the complaint should consider the applicabil-
ity of ADR techniques. A recommendation should then be made to a
centralized decisionmaking authority. Depending on the size of the
company, this may be the general counsel or an assistant general
counsel in charge of litigation. In some companies, a small ADR
committee may be appropriate and could consist of the initial screen-
ing official, a high-level representative of the general counsel, and a
business official familiar with the ongoing business relationships at
stake in the dispute. By concentrating ultimate decisionmaking au-
thority in one individual or a small working committee, the company
will ensure that all cases receive similar consideration. In addition,
the company will get the benefit of the judgment of a designated offi-
cial (or group of officials) who is aware of the entire range of dis-
putes that have been referred to ADR and understands the business
considerations involved in the effori to resolve the dispute promptly
(in many cases before litigation is even commenced).
Even if a matter is rejected for ADR after completion of the
screening process, periodic monitoring of the dispute should continue.
At regular intervals (for example, every six months), the official or
committee should conduct a brief review of every pending case to de-
termine whether references to ADR would now be appropriate.
Such periodic monitoring is necessary because disputes that are not
initially deemed appropriate for ADR may become so after the com-
pletion of limited discovery or motions practice. Before the company
commits additional resources to a particular case, for example, before
preparing a major motion, engaging in massive, expensive discovery,
or preparing witnesses for trial, the company should once again eval-
uate whether ADR might present an appropriate alternative for
resolving the dispute. At times, it may be appropriate to submit cer-
tain aspects of a case rather than the entire case to ADR. This is
likely to occur, in particular, with respect to neutral expert fact-
finding.
4. Substantive Criteria for Referring Cases to ADR
Ultimately, successful institutionalization of the use of ADR will
require companies to establish a presumption that all cases, with the
very limited exceptions in which settlement is inappropriate and
would convey the wrong message to potential adversaries, can be re-
solved through one or more ADR techniques. Realistically, however,
it is helpful to develop substantive criteria that can be used in
designating certain types of cases as particularly suitable for ADR
treatment. My firsthand experience at mediation demonstrates that
the following variables are critical in the decision to engage in ADR:
1. Uncertainty of result. Disputes in which the parties are either
unsure of the likelihood of success after protracted litigation or con-
front the potential for great exposure (or minimal recovery) are well-
suited for ADR consideration.
2. Inefficiencies in time and money. The likelihood of protracted
litigation, with its attendant costs and diversion of lawyer and com-
pany official time, often corroborates the advantages of ADR. This
factor is particularly important in contingent fee cases where the
plaintiff's attorney sees advantages to a prompt settlement without
the need to "bankroll" the litigation.
3. A desire to expedite discovery, depositions or both. ADR is
often effective when the parties see an advantage to short-circuiting
extensive discovery and/or depositions and desire to undertake
"mini-discovery" followed by a settlement proposal. This mini-dis-
covery approach is particularly welcome in disputes where the settle-
ment recommendation is nonbinding, thus offering the parties a "free
preview" of the case.
4. The amount or importance of the controversy. Most of the
largest cases are eventually settled, in part because of reluctance to
leave the decision to a court. High litigation costs, however, usually
seem less important in a case involving very high stakes or a vital
company interest. Thus, either or both parties may be reluctant to
take part in a collaborate effort at an early stage. If so, the prospects
are likely to be better after extensive discovery has taken place or
the imminence of trial exerts pressure for settlement.
5. Setting parameters for future conduct. A settlement agree-
ment can include provisions in the nature of injunctive relief that are
enforceable as contractual obligations. If litigation is pending, such
provisions can be incorporated in a consent decree.
6. Suitability for neutral expert factfinding. Whenever the par-
ties find it necessary to retain technical, economic, or other experts,
it may well be in their mutual interest to avoid the traditional battle
of the experts by jointly retaining a neutral whose findings are advi-
sory. These findings are likely to bring the parties much closer to
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settlement and, indeed, may enable the parties to avoid litigation
altogether.
The above criteria can serve as useful guidelines in assessing the
appropriateness of ADR techniques to a given dispute. Together
with a presumption in favor of use of ADR in all cases, these consid-
erations will help identify numerous cases in which a company can
experiment with various ADR devices. The company's experience
with ADR techniques can then be applied to modify or refine the
above criteria for assessing the ADR potential of a given dispute as
well as other aspects of the company's ADR program.
5. Establishing a Company Pilot Program
A useful ADR experiment and step toward full-scale institutional-
ization of ADR is the establishment of an in-house pilot program for
the voluntary' nonbinding mediation of certain corporate disputes.
Such a program allows a company to experiment with the systematic
consideration of ADR.
The way to start implementing such a pilot program is to define a
class of real and potential disputes for which nonbinding mediation
will most likely succeed. This means identifying a category of cases
in which the primary obstacle to mediation-the other side's reluc-
tance to try it-is minimized. My own experience indicates that the
cases most conducive to such a pilot program are so-called "family
disputes" in which, because of the relationship of the company to the
real or potential adversary, it will be less difficult to convince the
other side to participate. Such cases include employer-employee dis-
putes, disputes involving on-going business relationships, such as dis-
putes with distributors, suppliers, franchisees, subcontractors, and
disputes between insurers and their insureds.
To launch a pilot program, one or more company officials would
meet with a mediator to select a group of cases that will be the sub-
ject of the pilot program. This process of identifying a class of partic-
ularly suitable cases may also prove beneficial in establishing criteria
for subsequent systematic review of cases for ADR potential after the
expiration of the pilot program. The company official or officials
would also work with the mediator at this stage to develop a budget
for the pilot program.
The actual implementation of the pilot program would involve the
following steps: First, the company announces its decision to estab-
lish the pilot program in an effort to encourage existing and potential
S27
litigants to participate. The company then agrees on the rules and
criteria governing the program, making it clear that the mediation
process involved is voluntary, nonbinding, confidential and informal.
The mediation of disputes subject to the pilot program should be lim-
ited to thirty days from start to finish. The company should agree to
pay any and all costs associated with the pilot program. The media-
tion procedure employed in the pilot program should be a stream-
lined version of the Feinberg Mediation Process outlined in section
III, scheduled to fit within a thirty-day limitation, unless the parties
agree to extend the limitation in order to allow for mini-discovery.
During and after the pilot program, the mediator would meet with
the representatives of the company to evaluate its strengths and
weaknesses. The program could then be modified to make it as effec-
tive as possible, given the needs of the particular company experi-
menting with it. Ideally, the mediation program would eventually
become an institutional part of the company's dispute resolution pro-
cess and act as a catalyst for similar treatment of disputes outside of
the particular class of cases selected for purposes of experimentation.
C. Confidentiality
Another problem associated with mediation as a method of dispute
resolution is the legal uncertainty about the confidentiality of com-
munications made in the mediation process. As a practical matter,
the mutually agreed upon confidentiality of the mediation process is
both an incentive for participation in the process and a critical ingre-
dient for its success. Yet, as a legal matter, there is still considerable
uncertainty about the extent to which communications made during
the process of mediating a dispute are protected from disclosure in
subsequent legal proceedings. This uncertainty about the confidenti-
ality of mediation proceedings is cause for concern and may act as an
impediment to the future development of mediation as a widespread
method of dispute resolution.27
1. The Need for Confidentiality
Why is confidentiality critical to the success of mediation? First,
the mediator of a dispute needs a broad and comprehensive under-
standing of the case, particularly if the mediator is called upon to
fashion a settlement proposal (as is the case in my own mediation
27. A 1981 A.B.A. survey of mediation programs identified the question of
whether statements made by participants during the mediation session could be used
as evidence in subsequent legal proceedings as a predominant practical concern to al-
ternative dispute resolution programs. Freedman, Confidentiality: -A Closer Look, in
A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION:
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 47, 49 (1985).
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procedure outlined in section III). In order to acquire this compre-
hensive understanding of the case, the mediator must look beyond
the specific issues in dispute in an effort to illuminate and resolve the
underlying causes of the dispute. This may require knowledge of
proprietary information and/or information about internal corporate
politics, which parties may be unwilling to share absent a credible as-
surance of confidentiality. The mediator must also understand the
motives of the parties and their true needs, not merely their public
bargaining positions. The parties must, therefore, feel free to ad-
vance tentative solutions and to make statements without fear that
they will later be used as a basis for liability or as a measure of dam-
age. This is particularly true in disputes involving uncertain areas of
law, where limited abandonment of a firmly held legal position could
be interpreted by others outside of the process as a tacit concession of
the legal point.28 In sum, the success of a mediation hinges on can-
did, unrestricted dialogue and a free flow of information. In the ab-
sence of confidentiality, the exchange of information and ideas will
be inhibited, severely curtailing the chance of fashioning a successful
resolution to the dispute.
Second, the mediator must be perceived by the parties as com-
pletely neutral and impartial. This is necessary not only to ensure
openness, but also to preserve the integrity of the mediation process.
The presence of a neutral intermediary is, after all, the primary fea-
ture distinguishing mediation from conventional negotiation. Any
suspicion that the mediator may become an adversary or witness
against one of the parties in future litigation will undermine the par-
ties' trust in the mediator. Such suspicions will cause parties to a me-
diation to take a cautious, adversarial stance vis-a-vis the mediator,
making it difficult if not impossible for the mediator to create the co-
operative atmosphere necessary for successful mediation.
Ultimately, the fear that mediators may be required to divulge in-
formation after a mediation would discourage people from entering
into mediation at all. Thus, ensuring confidentiality is linked directly
to the public policy of encouraging resolution of disputes without re-
sort to litigation.
This public policy, and the need for confidentiality of mediation
proceedings, has been recognized formally in many contexts. The
statutes and regulations governing mediation programs affiliated
with the federal government, for example, provide for confidentiality
28. DAUER, supra note 1, at 2.
of the mediation proceedings. 29 Several state statutes enacted to ad-
vance the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques have also
recognized the need to assure confidentiality.30 Several organiza-
tions, including the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution,
have issued rules governing the conduct of mediation that include ex-
press confidentiality provisions.31 Most recently, in December 1988,
the Administrative Conference of the United States approved a
model rule on mediator confidentiality for federal agencies that use
mediation. 32 In recommending the adoption of the model rule, the
Chairman of the Conference recognized that "many of the benefits of
ADR can be achieved only if the proceedings are held confidential." 33
2. Means of Protecting the Confidentiality of Mediation
Despite these formal recognitions of the importance of protecting
the confidentiality of mediations, there is still considerable uncer-
tainty about whether communications made during mediation are le-
gally protected from disclosure, particularly in subsequent litigation.
The following discussion of this issue will demonstrate that there are
several legal and practical tools that can be used to prevent disclo-
sure of mediation proceedings. Each of these tools, however, has cer-
tain weaknesses that might make it less than totally effective,
especially in a situation in which someone who was not a party to the
mediation seeks disclosure of some aspect of the proceedings. The re-
sulting legal uncertainty about the inviolability of mediation proceed-
ings gives mediators and potential parties to mediation some cause
29. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) (informal conciliation efforts of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); 42 U.S.C. § 2000g-2(b) (1982) (confiden-
tiality clause in statute governing Department of Justice Community Relations Ser-
vice); 29 CFR § 1401.2 (1988) (Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service regulations,
upheld in NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980)); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.26 (1987) (provisions governing informal conciliation efforts of Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission); 45 C.F.R. § 90.43 (1987) (regulation governing media-
tion of age discrimination disputes).
30. See generally A.B.A., State Legislation on Dispute Resolution: Laws Providing
for Informal and Non-Judicial Processes in the 50 States and the District of Columbia,
Monograph Series No. IIIB (1988); infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
31. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL MEDIATION RULES 12
(1987); CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Denver, Colo.), Code of Professional Con-
duct for Mediators, reprinted in S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESO.
LUTION 116, 119 (1985); SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Ethical
Standards of Professional Responsibility para. 3 (1986), in 1 Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution Rep. (BNA) 55 (May 28, 1987).
32. ACUS RECOMMENDATION 88-11, Encouraging Settlements by Protecting Media-
tor Confidentiality (1988) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.88-11). See also Harter,
Neither Cop nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensur-
ing Mediator Confidentiality, in REP. TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES (Nov. 15, 1988); ACUS Approves Model Rule on Mediator Confidential-
ity, 3 Alternative Dispute Resolution Rep. (BNA) 20 (Jan. 19, 1989).
33. ACUS RECOMMENDATION, supra note 32.
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for uneasiness. Recent efforts by state legislatures to guarantee the
confidentiality of mediation are encouraging, however, and alleviate
some of the uncertainty in this area.
Readers should also bear in mind that, ultimately, the issue of con-
fidentiality of mediation must be viewed in practical, relative terms.
As a practical matter, mediation still provides parties with considera-
bly more confidentiality than litigation. Concerns about the confi-
dentiality of mediation should, therefore, be addressed, but should
not act as a major deterrent to participation in mediation. With that
in mind, I will proceed to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of
various practices and theories for protecting the confidentiality of
mediation.
a. Confidentiality Agreements
One important means of protecting the confidentiality of communi-
cations made during mediation is for the parties to the mediation and
the mediator to enter into an explicit agreement setting for their ex-
pectations and obligations with regard to the confidentiality of the
proceedings. The ground rules for my own mediation procedure ad-
dress the issue of confidentiality directly and comprehensively: The
parties agree that all offers, promises, conduct, and statements,
whether oral or written, made in the course of the mediation process
by any of the parties or their representatives are confidential, and
that such information is neither admissible nor discoverable for any
purpose in litigation among the parties. The parties also agree that
the mediator is disqualified as a litigation witness for any party and
that the mediator's oral and written opinions are deemed inadmissi-
ble for all purposes.3 4 Such agreements can be formally reduced to
writing and theoretically are enforceable against a contravening
party in a private suit for damages.
Unfortunately, however, the effectiveness of such an agreement to
bar discovery or admission of evidence in court is largely a matter of
judicial discretion and will involve a balancing of public policy con-
cerns. Despite the public policy in favor of dispute resolution outside
34. For examples of the terms of other confidentiality agreements recommended
for use in mediation, see AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL MEDIA-
TION RULES 5 (1986), reprinted in CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, PRACTICE GUIDE ON MEDIA-
TION, supra note 14, at C3; CPR SAMPLE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT, CPR Model
ADR Procedures in Technology Disputes, ANNEX J. (1987), reprinted in CPR LEGAL
PROGRAM INFORMATION PACKAGE ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF ADR PROCEEDINGS (1986-
1987) (available from Center for Public Resources, 608 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY
10019).
of court, there is a risk that courts will refuse to enforce confidential-
ity agreements when competing public policies favor disclosure.3 5
This is particularly true in cases in which the court believes that en-
forcing the agreement would be unfair, or where an inquiry into
criminal conduct is involved.36
Furthermore, even if confidentiality agreements are enforceable
between the parties, they do not bind nonparties and, therefore, will
have little effect on the ability of a nonparty to discover or introduce
evidence of mediation proceedings. Two recent cases illustrate this
point and demonstrate judicial hostility to private agreements to
foreclose court access to evidence.
In Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp.,37 the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York permitted a third
party to obtain discovery of a report prepared by the neutral fact-
finder on the effects of certain price-fixing activities, despite the fact
that the report contained a confidentiality provision limiting the use
of the report in litigation. The court rejected the argument that the
confidentiality agreement immunized the report and related material
from discovery, stating that parties may not be permitted "to contract
privately for the confidentiality of documents, and foreclose others
from obtaining, in the course of litigation, materials that are relevant
to their efforts to vindicate a legal position."3 8
Similarly, in Bennett v. La Pere,3 9 the District Court for Rhode Is-
land allowed a non-settling defendant to discover settlement docu-
ments despite what the court called a "boilerplate paragraph" calling
for confidentiality of the agreement. 40 The court stated that "liti-
gants cannot so easily collogue to screen themselves from the rigors
of pretrial discovery" and pointed out that "[w]hatever suppressive
effect the confidentiality clause may have had as between the [parties
to the agreement], it cannot be allowed to bar the nonsettling defend-
ant's right to inquire into the settlement."41
Thus, as a legal matter, confidentiality agreements entered into
within the framework of a mediation will not guarantee that aspects
of the mediation will not be disclosed in subsequent litigation. In-
35. See Murphy, In the Wake of Tarasoff: Mediation and the Duty to Disclose, 35
CATH. U.L. REv. 209, 227 n.109 (1985) (and cases cited therein); Note, Protecting Confi-
dentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451 n.72 (1984) (and cases cited
therein).
36. See Brazil, Protecting the Conifidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HAS-
TINGS L. J. 955, 1027-28 (1988).
37. 91 F.R.D. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
38. Id. at 87-88.
39. 112 F.R.D. 136 (D.R.I. 1986).
40. Id. at 140.
41. Accord Magnaleasing, 'Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559, 562 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
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deed, they are unlikely to have any impact when a nonparty to the
agreement tries to gain access to covered information. Nonetheless,
these agreements are useful because they may serve as a deterrent to
the disclosure of information by parties to the agreement, and fur-
ther, because they may influence the way in which a court exercises
its discretion when confronted with an attempt by a party to the con-
fidentiality agreement to compel testimony by the mediator or other-
wise access mediation materials. 42
b. Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure
The rules and principles governing the admissibility and discovery
of evidence can also provide some protection against disclosure of me-
diation proceedings in subsequent litigation.
i. Rule 408
One approach to protecting the confidentiality of mediation is to
look to the protection afforded to settlement negotiations by Federal
Rule of Evidence 408, which restricts the admissibility of conduct and
statements made during compromise negotiations. 43 The purpose of
the rule is to promote "free and frank" discussions of settlement pro-
42. See Drukker Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(holding that testimony of NLRB agent should have been admitted in proceeding be-
low, but stating that explicit notice to parties that Board agent would not be permitted
to testify would affect court's view of matter); NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618
F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980) (participant in Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service pro-
ceeding charged with acceptance of restriction on the subsequent testimonial use of the
mediator).
43. The text of the rule is as follows:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising
or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity
or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or
its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotia-
tions is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prej-
udice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort
to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408. This restriction on the admissibility of compromise negotiations ap-
pears in some form in the evidence code of every state. DAUER, supra note 1, at 4.
Some state versions may, however, be more limited than the federal version which
covers not only the settlement itself but also any discussions during the negotiations.
Trout, Confidentiality in Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 9, reprinted in
CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, INFORMATION PACKAGE ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF ADR PRO-
CEEDINGS (1986-87).
posals in an effort to encourage the nonjudicial settlement of dis-
putes.44 This purpose is entirely consistent with the goal of
encouraging the resolution of disputes through mediation by protect-
ing the confidentiality of mediation proceedings. Thus, the protection
of confidentiality provided by rule 408 would logically extend to me-
diation proceedings.
Unfortunately, however, the protection afforded by rule 408 is lim-
ited in several significant respects, making the rule "an insecure basis
for protection" of mediation proceedings.45
One significant limitation of rule 408 is that it bars the admission
of evidence only when it is offered to prove the validity or amount of
the disputed claim. It would not therefore prevent admission of set-
tlement negotiations in an effort to prove or challenge the actual set-
tlement agreement arising out of the negotiations or to challenge the
conduct of the negotiations. It would also not bar evidence offered to
impeach a nonparty witness. Evidence offered to support or rebut a
related, but technically different, claim would also not be barred.
A related issue is that, while the rule clearly prevents the admissi-
bility of statements made in settlement negotiations in subsequent
litigation between the parties, it is less clear with regard to the ad-
missibility of settlement negotiations in litigation between one of the
parties and an unrelated third party.46 Generally, however, courts
have recognized the need to protect against disclosure of settlement
of similar cases involving co-plaintiffs or co-defendants.47
Another very significant limitation of the rule is that, by its terms,
it applies only to the admission of evidence at trial, not to pre-trial
discovery. The policy behind the rule would appear to support pre-
clusion of discovery as well as admissibility of compromise negotia-
tions because fear of disclosure through discovery could also
discourage compromise discussion. Courts, however, are split on
whether rule 408 precludes discovery of settlement discussions. The
44. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note ("a more consistent ground [for
exclusion] is the promotion of public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of
disputes"); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (rule seeks to "promote
nonjudicial settlement of disputes"); S. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1973)
("The purpose of this rule is to encourage settlements which would be discouraged if
[evidence of settlement or attempted settlement] were admissible."); 2 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 408[01], at 408-09.
45. Harter, supra note 32, at 11 (outlining exceptions to and limitations of rule
408). For more comprehensive discussions of the limitations of rule 408 as well as sug-
gested strategies to overcome them, see Brazil, supra note 36; Comment, Protecting
Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 448-50 (1984).
46. See generally Restivo, Jr. & Mangus, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Confi-
dential Problem Solving or Every Man's Evidence?, in 2 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH
COST OF LITIGATION 5, 7-8 (May 1984).
47. See Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1976); Young v. Verson All-
steel Press Co., 539 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Scaramuzzo v. Glenmore Distilleries,
Co., 501 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ill. '1980).
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majority view appears to be that rule 408 does not create a general
privilege for settlement discussions that would exempt them from
the broad scope of permissible discovery,4 8 which is defined as "any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter of the
pending action."49
However, while not extending a general privilege, several cases
have applied the public policy considerations underlying rule 408 to
bar discovery, at least in the absence of a particularized showing that
discovery of the settlement negotiations would be likely to reveal ad-
missible evidence.50 On the other hand, at least one federal court has
squarely rejected the notion that rule 408 bars discovery of compro-
mise negotiations as well as the contention that the public policy con-
siderations underlying the rule apply to discovery as well as
admissibility at trial.51
In sum, while the policy considerations underlying rule 408 will
provide fuel for the arguments of those seeking to maintain the con-
fidentiality of mediation proceedings, the limitations of the rule
make it an inadequate source of protection.
ii. Rule 403
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence may also be helpful in
preventing the disclosure of communications made during media-
tion.52 Regardless of the applicability of other specific rules of evi-
dence, rule 403 requires courts to balance the probative value of the
evidence sought to be introduced against the harm likely to result
from its admission.53 This requirement offers proponents of the con-
fidentiality of mediation proceedings the opportunity to make a vari-
ety of arguments based on such factors as the risk of prejudice, the
availability of other means of proof, as well as the policy argument
48. Brazil, supra note 36, at 988, 990-99.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
50. See Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1981); Weissman v.
Fruchtman, No. 83-8958 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds); Bottaro v. Hat-
ton Assoc., 96 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
51. Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (D.R.I. 1986). In addition, the court
suggested that the discovery of a settlement agreement could be justified on the basis
of rule 408's exception allowing admission of settlement discussions if offered for a
purpose other than to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount made:
"There is, of course, no satisfactory way for [the party seeking access to the settlement
agreement] to determine whether it can slip within the integument of the Rule 408
exception unless it gains discovery access to the settlement documents." Id. at 139.
52. See Brazil, supra note 36, at 982-87 and cases cited therein.
53. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
behind rule 408-namely, the importance of promoting the nonjudi-
cial resolution of disputes by protecting the confidentiality of settle-
ment discussions.
Again, however, the applicability of the rule is limited to the ad-
missibility, as opposed to the discovery, of mediation proceedings and
lies wholly within the discretion of the court. Thus, rule 403 is not a
reliable and predictable source of protection for communication made
in the course of mediation.
iii. Work Product Doctrine
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs dis-
covery during litigation, offers other potential means of protecting
the confidentiality of mediation proceedings. Rule 26(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, which codifies the
work product doctrine enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor,54 may pro-
vide some limited protection. This doctrine limits the discovery of
materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by a party or his rep-
resentative, including "his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer, or agent."55 Its applicability to a mediator is unclear, espe-
cially because it applies only to materials prepared "in anticipation of
litigation" and is designed to protect the adversary system. One com-
mentator, however, has remarked that a mediator, while not acting
as an attorney for either party, is an agent, representative, and con-
sultant to all the parties to a mediation. Therefore, "it would be only
a short step to apply the workproduct doctrine to a mediator, and in-
deed its contours fit remarkably well." 56
One lower court decision barring discovery of documents prepared
by an "environmental" mediator, except to the extent that they had
been made public, referred to the mediator's "work product," indicat-
ing that the doctrine may be applicable to mediation.5 7 In another
case, however, the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York held the doctrine inapplicable to a report prepared by a neutral
factfinder for use in settlement without prospect for use in litiga-
tion.58 The court emphasized that "the work product doctrine de-
rives from the notion that 'a common law trial is and always should
be an adversary proceeding'" and observed that the report at issue
"was intended to be the common foundation for settlement of the
54. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
55. FED. R. CIv. P: 26(b)(3).
56. Harter, supra note 32, at 14.
57. Adler v. Adams, No. 673-73C2, magistrate's order (W.D. Was. 1979), aff'd, June
7, 1979 (unreported but reproduced along with underlying pleadings in A.B.A. SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTI-
TIONER'S GUIDE 245 (1985)).
58. Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84 (1981).
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claims of three sets of adversaries .... It did not embody an adver-
sary's competing view of the effects of asserted . . .violations."59
Such language cases considerable doubt on the usefulness of the doc-
trine in mediation.
Furthermore, the protection afforded by the doctrine is not com-
plete. Litigants can still gain access to covered' materials upon a
showing of substantial need for the materials or undue hardship in
obtaining the sought information from other sources.
iv. Protective Orders
Another potential source of confidentiality is rule 26(c) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the issuance of pro-
tective orders precluding discovery. 60 Thus, parties to a mediation
arising out of a case already filed in court may seek a protective or-
der to prevent disclosure of the mediation proceedings. The protec-
tion afforded by this procedure, however, is unpredictable because
courts enjoy enormous discretion in issuing the order and in estab-
lishing its scope. Those seeking a protective order against the disclo-
sure of mediation proceedings can assert the strong public policy
favoring the nonjudicial settlement of disputes. This may well influ-
ence the court's balancing of the prejudice caused by disclosure
against the needs of other parties for the information.
The effectiveness of court protective orders is severely limited by
the fact that the court has the power to modify existing protective or-
ders so as to allow disclosure in later proceedings. 61 The likelihood
that a protective order will be ineffective has led one knowledgeable
commentator to advise parties to a mediation not to file with the
court any settlement that is reached: "If you file it under seal with
the court, it's pretty clear that seal is going to be full of holes."62
c. Protecting the Mediator
While the above discussion demonstrates that federal rules of evi-
dence and civil procedure may offer some protection to mediations,
59. Id. at 88. The court also observed that disclosure to an adversary waives the
work product protection as to items actually disclosed, even where disclosure occurs in
settlement. Id. at 90.
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
61. See, e.g., Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1986); Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986). But
see Palmieri v. State of New York, 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985).
62. CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, Proceedings, ADR Confidentiality, reprinted in 5 AL-
TERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 16, 96 (June 1987).
they do not address specifically the issue of whether a mediator and/
or a mediator's notes are subject to subpoena. The issue of whether a
mediator will be entitled to an evidentiary privilege preventing him
or her from being forced to testify requires courts to balance the
need for the information against the harm from its disclosure.63
While no general privilege for mediators has been established, sev-
eral courts have excluded mediator testimony on public policy
grounds. For example, the immunity of federal labor mediators from
subpoena was established in NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc.6 4 In that
case, the Ninth Circuit upheld the National Labor Relation Board's
revocation of a subpoena of a Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service mediator capable of providing information crucial to resolu-
tion of a factual dispute between the parties. The court held that the
public interest in maintaining the perceived and actual impartiality of
federal mediators outweighs the benefits to be derived from the me-
diator's testimony. The court focused, however, on the public inter-
est in ensuring industrial stability and the legislative framework
under which the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service oper-
ates. Thus, while the case provides a helpful analogy, its reasoning is
technically limited to government labor mediators.65
The issue of whether private labor mediators are entitled to an evi-
dentiary privilege was addressed by the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. United Auto
Workers.66 The mediators' testimony was sought after a dispute
arose between the parties to the mediation about whether a bargain-
ing agreement had been reached. The court granted a protective or-
der limiting discovery of the mediator's notes and allowing deposition
examinations only with regard to public statements and documents
63. See Drukker Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 727, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
64. 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Pipefitters Local No. 208 v. Mechanical
Contractors Ass'n of Colorado, 90 Lab. Cas. 12,647, 1980 Westlaw 2169 (D. Colo. 1980).
But cf Drukker Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding
that testimony of NLRB agent who assisted party in drafting stipulation should have
been required based on balance of need against harm under specific facts, despite rec-
ognition that agent's action was akin to agency mediation protected by evidentiary
privilege).
65. Mediators working within the framework of other governmental programs
have also been protected. See, e.g., City of Port Arthur, Texas v. United States, No. 80-
0648, court order quashing subpoena (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1980) (U.S. Department of Jus-
tice Community Relations Service), reprinted in A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION, CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 223
(1985); Adler v. Adams, No. 673-73C2, magistrate's order (W.D. Wash. 1979), aff'd,
June 7, 1979 (Washington State Office of Environmental Mediation) (unreported deci-
sion reproduced along with underlying pleadings in A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 245
(1985)). The district court's summary affirmation of the magistrate's order in Adler is
commented on in Liepmann, supra note 12, at 111-29.
66. No. 87-265 (D.D.C. 1987) (order without written opinion commented on in 1
ADR Rep. (BNA), at 212-13 (Sept. 17, 1987)).
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that have been made available to the public. Ruling from the bench,
the court stated that "the whole mediation process could be brought
into question" by allowing the litigants to question the mediators and
that this would call into question "severe public-policy issues ... as to
the mediation process. '6 7 The court stressed, however, that the rul-
ing did not establish a mediator's privilege, stating "I am not barring
their depositions from being taken totally. I want that understood. I
don't believe in the privilege situation, [or] that that is the appropri-
ate procedure."68 The attorney representing the mediators, however,
characterized the case as staying only "'half a step away' from fully
establishing a privilege for private, as opposed to public,
mediation."69
Such cases demonstrate that the public policy favoring dispute res-
olution outside of court can be very influential in protecting a media-
tor from being forced to testify. Case by case balancing of the public
interest in favor of protection against the need for the particular in-
formation sought, however, does not offer reliable and predictable re-
sults. Thus, as with reliance on the evidentiary and procedural
theories discussed above, current case law on mediator immunity of-
fers less than satisfactory assurance of the confidentiality of media-
tion proceedings.
d. Statutory Protection
The uncertainty associated with relying on current case law and
existing evidentiary procedural rules has led several legislatures to
enact statutes that provide explicit protection to mediation proceed-
ings.70 Many of these statutes are linked to governmental mediation
programs and therefore provide protection to private mediators only
by analogy and by evidencing a public policy in favor of confidential-
ity in mediation.71 Others, however, contain general confidentiality
provisions that apply to private civil mediations as well.72 Such gen-
eral statutes often require mediators to have certain qualifications as
67. 1 ADR Rep. (BNA), at 213 (Sept. 17, 1987).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See generally A.B.A., supra note 30; Harter, supra note 32, at 24-25; C.
MCEWEN & N. ROGERS, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (1989 Lawyer's
Coop.) (forthcoming).
71. See, e.g., Colorado Dispute Resolution Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-301-11
(1987 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b(6) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
72. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (1988).
a condition to coverage under the legislation.73
The relevant statutes vary widely in scope and must be examined
carefully to ascertain the exact measure of protection afforded. Sev-
eral contain various exceptions to the confidentiality of mediation
proceedings in certain cases, such as in an action against a mediator
for damages. 74 Some allow the parties to waive the confidentiality of
the proceeding. 75 Under others, however, the confidentiality privi-
lege belongs exclusively to the mediator.76
The strength of the protection offered by such statutes is illus-
trated by the case of People v. Snyder,77 in which the court refused,
despite compelling circumstances, to breach the strict confidentiality
provision of the New York statute that established a Community Dis-
pute Resolution Center program.78 The case involved a plea of self-
defense by a defendant who had previously participated in a media-
tion with the murder victim. The District Attorney sought access to
the records of the mediation, which took place prior to the fatal
shooting. The court, however, held that even if the defendant could
be found to have waived the confidentiality of the records, the statute
permitted no such waiver, and that allowing access to the records
would subvert the legislature's clear intention to guarantee the confi-
dentiality of all such records and communications. 79
Such strong legislative assurances of the confidentiality of media-
tion procedures provide much stronger protection than theories
based on existing case law and evidentiary rules. They also provide
further evidence of the strong public policy in favor of ensuring the
confidentiality of mediation. Thus, such statutes, even if not directly
applicable, help to strengthen the arguments available under the
rules of evidence and civil procedure. They are therefore an encour-
aging development in this uncertain area.
73. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 23(c) (1985).
74. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22
(1988).
75. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5 (West Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
581.22 (1988).
76. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 23(c) (1985).
77. 129 Misc. 2d 137, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (1985).
78. Id. at 139, 492 NY.S.2d at 892.
79. Id. Compare Florida v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), in
which the court compelled mediator testimony in support of contention of self-defense
where arguments for the exclusion of such testimony were not based on a special stat-
utory confidentiality provision, but rather were based on a privilege rationale, a state
equivalent of rule 408, and on an agreement regarding confidentiality. The court
stated that "[i]f confidentiality is essential to the success of the [community mediation]
program, the legislature is the proper branch of government from which to obtain the
necessary protection." Id. at 482.
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e. The Bottom Line on Confidentiality
The above discussion demonstrates there is no iron-clad guarantee
that the confidentiality of mediation proceedings will be respected in
subsequent litigation. This is particularly true where nonparties to
the mediation seek access to the mediation proceedings or its results
because confidentiality agreements and relevant rules of evidence
and civil procedure may not apply. However, strong public policy ar-
guments based on the public interest in encouraging nonjudicial dis-
pute resolution can be asserted to persuade a court to protect
confidentiality and courts have been responsive to such concerns.
Furthermore, legislatures are increasingly recognizing the value of
protecting the confidentiality of mediation.
Finally, even in the current atmosphere of legal uncertainty, par-
ties considering mediation must bear in mind that, as a practical mat-
ter, mediation offers considerably more confidentiality than
alternatives such as litigation. Information provided to the court dur-
ing litigation or offered into evidence at trial is generally subject to
public examination and even media coverage.8 0 In mediation, on the
other hand, all of the participants, including the mediator, place a
high premium on confidentiality and are likely to take all possible
practical steps to protect it.
V. CONCLUSION
Those interested in using mediation to resolve disputes and in see-
ing mediation develop into a widely used means of conflict resolution
still face problems, including the unwillingness of many to try media-
tion, the lack of institutionalized consideration of mediation as an al-
ternative to litigation, and legal uncertainty about the confidentiality
of the process. These problems, however, are not insurmountable
and do not outweigh the important advantages of mediation as a
means of resolving disputes. The many advantageous features of me-
diation include its cost-effectiveness, its informality, its flexibility, its
adaptability to a variety of disputes, and its fully voluntary and non-
binding nature. Section III of this article outlines a procedure that
maximizes these advantages and that has a proven record of success.
In the final analysis, parties to a dispute should not hesitate to try
mediation. Its potential for successfully resolving the dispute is great
80. See In re Application of National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir.
1980) (presumption in favor of public inspection of items offered into evidence at pub-
lic civil trial).
and the risk of failure is no more than to resort to the familiar course
of litigation.
